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Euroscepticism vs. Political Pragmatism: 
The Finns Party tones down its criticism of the EU 
Tuomas Iso-Markku 
s expected, Eurosceptic forces of different political shades were among the major winners of 
the 2014 European Parliament elections. Eurosceptic parties grew compared to the 2009 EP 
elections in several member states, including the EU’s founding members France, Germany 
and Italy and non-eurozone countries the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden. In Finland, the 
populist and Eurosceptic Finns Party, formerly known as True Finns, was also able to improve on its 
2009 result. The party emerged as Finland’s third-biggest party, gaining 12.9% of the vote in the 2014 
EP elections. This represents an increase of 3.1 percentage points in comparison to 2009 and entitles 
the party to two seats in the 8
th
 European Parliament, as opposed to the one seat it held in the 7
th
 EP.
1
 
Despite the gains, the Finns Party’s leader Timo Soini was unable to hide his disappointment when the 
preliminary results of the Finnish EP elections came through: the party had expected, and the polls had 
forecast, more. After the Finnish presidential elections in January 2012 and the municipal elections in 
October 2012, this was the third time in a row that the Finns Party had been unable to live up to its 
own heightened expectations, finishing third with almost seven percentage points behind the second-
placed Centre Party and far below the 19.05% mark it reached in the Finnish parliamentary election in 
2011. Party leader Soini bemoaned the low turnout in Finland, indicating that many of the Finns 
Party’s supporters had simply stayed at home.2 Although the low turnout might indeed be part of the 
explanation, the interesting question is why the Finns Party was not able to mobilise all of its 
(potential) voters at a time when Eurosceptic and EU-critical parties elsewhere in Europe were 
celebrating major victories. The answer probably lies both in the changing political environment as 
well as developments within the party itself since its unprecedented electoral triumph in 2011. 
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Euroscepticism in a changing political climate 
The Finns Party’s rapid rise began in the late 2000s. Finland’s three biggest political parties were all, 
to varying degrees, involved in a scandal regarding undisclosed campaign funding during the 2007 
parliamentary elections. This provided favourable conditions for an anti-establishment party like the 
Finns Party, which was originally built on the ruins of the populist Finnish Rural Party and has always 
seen itself as a representative of ordinary people; mixing left-leaning social and economic policies 
with nationalism and conservative values. Chairman Soini himself was the Finns Party’s top candidate 
in the 2009 EP elections, emphasising that his party represented a true alternative to the mainstream 
parties and their consensus-oriented EU policies.
3
 In the end, the Finns Party gained 9.8% of the votes 
and Soini received more votes than any other Finnish EP candidate. 
It was the unfolding of the eurozone crisis that allowed the Finns Party to establish itself as one of 
Finland’s four big parties, however. Encouraged by Finland’s excellent credit rating and relatively low 
level of public debt, many Finnish voters have been very critical of the notion that Finland should 
assume financial responsibility for the problems of other eurozone members. From the very beginning 
of the crisis, the Finns Party has been eager to fan the flames of discontent, presenting itself as an 
adamant opponent of the bailout loans and an uncompromising defender of Finland’s national interest. 
Prior to the 2011 elections, the party also both spurred and capitalised on the heated immigration 
debate in Finland.
4
 
Much has changed since the early days of the eurozone crisis, however. To begin with, the crisis has 
entered a less acute phase. This allows the architects and proponents of the EU’s crisis policies in 
Brussels and Helsinki to proclaim that the measures adopted, including the much-contested rescue 
loans, are bearing fruit, even if the recovery remains fragile. Meanwhile, Finland’s own economic 
outlook has worsened dramatically and the country’s public debt is soon set to exceed the 60% of the 
GDP limit laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. The downturn has eroded some of the self-
confidence that bolstered the Finns at the beginning of the crisis.
5
 Moreover, the economic slump has 
served to gradually shift the focus of Finnish politics from European affairs back to domestic issues, as 
the biggest threats facing the Finnish economy are no longer seen to emanate from the crisis-ridden 
eurozone countries. As a result, the Finns Party has had fewer possibilities to use the eurozone crisis as 
an electoral trump card. 
At the same time, the recent events in Ukraine have reminded many euro-weary Finns of why Finland 
joined the EU in the first place; security having been one of the principal motives for Finnish EU 
membership. For the Finns Party, formulating a clear position on the Ukraine crisis has proven 
challenging. Party leader Soini, who also acts as chair of the Finnish Parliament’s Foreign Affairs 
Committee, has argued that Finland needs to speak with one voice on foreign and security policy 
matters, insisting that the Finns Party supports the president and the government in the conduct of 
Finnish foreign policy.
6
 Accordingly, the party condemned the Crimean independence referendum and 
approves of the EU sanctions targeting individual Russian and Ukrainian officials.
7
 On the other hand, 
                                                     
3
 See Tapio Raunio, “The European Parliament election in Finland”, European Parliament Election Briefing No. 
26, European Parties Elections and Referendums Network, 7 June 2009 
(https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=epern-no-26-finland-2009.pdf&site=266). 
4
 See Juha Jokela and Kaisa Korhonen, “A Eurosceptic big bang – Finland’s EU policy in hindsight from the 
2011 elections”, FIIA Briefing Paper No. 106, 23 May 2012 
(http://www.fiia.fi/fi/publication/264/a_eurosceptic_big_bang/). 
5
 Kristi Raik, “Finland turns humble as its economic outlook worsens”, Euro Crisis in the Press Blog, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 19 August 2013 
(http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2013/08/19/finland-turns-humble-as-its-economic-outlook-worsens/). 
6
 Piia Elonen, “Timo Soini nosti puoluettaan sote-pöytiin ja hallitukseen”, Helsingin Sanomat, 3 May 2014 
(http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/a1399082572407). 
7
 Marko Junkkari, “Perussuomalaiset: Venäjän talouspakotteita tulisi välttää”, Helsingin Sanomat, 18 March 
2014 (http://www.hs.fi/talous/a1395111523285). 
EUROSCEPTICISM V. POLITICAL PRAGMATISM | 3 
Soini has described the Ukraine crisis as an example of how Finland as an EU member can get drawn 
into international conflicts, regardless of its own intentions. The Finns Party has also been critical of 
possible economic sanctions against Russia, arguing that they would be more harmful for Finland than 
for most other EU member states and emphasising the importance of maintaining good bilateral 
relations with Russia.
8
  
Last but not least, the Finns Party is to some extent a victim of its own success. After the party’s 
unprecedented electoral triumph in 2011, almost all Finnish parties have adopted more critical views 
on specific aspects of the European integration process, adapting their rhetoric accordingly.
9
 
Consequently, the Finns Party’s recent attempts to depict other parties, particularly the Centre Party 
and the National Coalition Party as federalists, sounded rather hollow. At the same time, surveys 
suggest that Finnish voter support for Finland’s membership of the EU and the euro has remained 
somewhat stable throughout the crisis.
10
 This has given the mainstream parties – all of which remain 
principally pro-European – more confidence to challenge the Finns Party and to demand concrete 
alternatives to the policies it opposes. As a result, the Finns Party is, in contrast to the period right 
before and shortly after the 2011 Finnish parliamentary election, no longer able to solely dominate and 
steer the EU debate in Finland. 
From Eurosceptics to EU critics? 
As the political environment has changed, significant developments have taken place within the Finns 
Party itself as well. At last year’s party conference, Chairman Soini declared that his main goal was to 
lead the party into the next Finnish government. To underline his determination, Soini announced that 
he would not run in this year’s EP elections, concentrating on domestic politics instead.11 On the one 
hand, the desire to assume a seat at the government table reflects the growing ambitions within the 
Finns Party and its leadership. On the other hand, it is arguably also a reaction to the party’s declining 
ability to influence Finnish EU policy from the ranks of the opposition and by shaping public opinion.  
In order to gear up for government duties, the Finns Party has recently moderated its views on and 
above all its rhetoric towards the EU, as participation in any Finnish government would require the 
party to move closer to the mainstream parties’ EU policies. Tellingly, at the very same party 
conference where Soini announced his intention to take the party into the government, the Finns Party 
also discussed its position towards Finland’s membership in the eurozone. In the end, no clear position 
was defined, with the party’s sole MEP Sampo Terho simply stating that the Finns Party is not 
committed to the euro, but would not actively support a Finnish eurozone exit either.
12
 
The Finns Party’s election manifesto for this year’s EP elections continued in a similar vein, 
attempting to shed the protest party image and instead portraying the party as an EU-critical reform 
party.
13
 The manifesto applauded David Cameron’s proposal for a thorough reform of the EU as well 
as the Dutch government’s idea to roll back the EU’s powers in certain policy areas. It also criticised 
the rescue packages and all related policy measures, such as the European Stability Mechanism, the 
two-pack and the six-pack. The manifesto did not, however, demand that Finland leave the EU or the 
eurozone, culminating in the statement that there should be “less, but better EU”. In the same way, the 
Finns Party has tried to temper its members’ comments on migration and asylum policy. However, it 
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has to be noted that the most popular candidate of the party by far in the EP elections was MP Jussi 
Halla-aho, who has made a name for himself as one of the Finns Party’s primary immigration critics. 
The gradual move of the Finns Party towards the more moderate EU-critic camp was sealed after the 
EP elections, as the party decided to leave the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group 
headed by the UK Independence Party, instead joining the British Tories in the European 
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group. Membership in the bigger and significantly more 
cohesive ECR group will certainly open up a new channel of influence for the Finns Party; something 
that could benefit the party on the domestic stage as well. That being said, the backlash the move has 
provoked in the European press
14
 has most likely come as a surprise to the party. 
Conclusion 
While many Eurosceptic parties in Europe achieved historical successes in this year’s EP elections, the 
Finns Party has had to face difficult questions and choices for a while now. In the long term, the 
crucial question is how the developments currently taking place within the party will affect its role 
within the Finnish, and European, political landscape. Will the more moderate incarnation of the Finns 
Party fare as well with protest voters and Eurosceptic hardliners as the Finns Party’s previous 
embodiment as an anti-establishment protest party did? Is the party able to attract new support?  
It already seems clear that the competition for potential Finns Party voters will become stiffer. In the 
EP elections, the Centre Party successfully challenged the Finns Party by running both EU insider Olli 
Rehn and well-known Eurosceptic Paavo Väyrynen as candidates at the same time. The Social 
Democratic Party, for its part, recently elected the plain-speaking trade unionist Antti Rinne as its new 
chairman. The choice suggests that the party is seriously trying to lure back some of the blue-collar 
voters it lost to the Finns Party. Meanwhile, the Finns Party itself is still very reliant on Chairman 
Soini, with no credible successor or challenger in sight. 
The next Finnish parliamentary elections, scheduled to take place in April 2015, will be a litmus test 
for the Finns Party, showing whether the strategic adjustments the party has made start to pay off. So 
far, polls suggest that the Finns Party would retain its place among Finland’s biggest parties.15 
However, the polls did overestimate the party’s support prior to the EP elections. In the end, much will 
also depend on what happens in Europe and the wider world in the months before the elections. A 
renewed worsening of the eurozone crisis – perhaps even just a concrete proposal for a further rescue 
package for Greece – could see the Finns Party’s popularity soar once again. However, if the party 
really wants to pursue the moderate course it has now embarked upon, it will have to word its 
messages more carefully – not an easy task for a party with such a strong protest tradition. 
                                                     
14
 Alex Barker, “MEPs with criminal records join Tories’ Eurosceptic group”, Financial Times, 4 June 2014. 
15
 In the latest poll of the Finnish public broadcasting company YLE the Finns Party ranks third with 18.9% of 
the vote. 
About EPIN 
EPIN is a network of European think tanks and policy institutes with members in almost 
every member state and candidate country of the European Union. It was established in 2002 
during the constitutional Convention on the Future of Europe. Then, its principal role was to 
follow the works of the Convention. More than 30 conferences in member states and 
candidate countries were organised in the following year.  
With the conclusion of the Convention, CEPS and other participating institutes decided to 
keep the network in operation. EPIN has continued to follow the constitutional process in all 
its phases: (1) the intergovernmental conference of 2003-2004; (2) the ratification process of 
the Constitutional Treaty; (3) the period of reflection; and (4) the intergovernmental 
conference of 2007. Currently, EPIN follows (5) the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty 
and – should the treaty enter into force – (6) the implementation of the Treaty. 
Since 2005, an EPIN Steering Committee takes the most important decisions. Currently there 
are seven member institutes: CEPS, Clingendael (the Netherlands), EIR (Romania), 
ELCANO (Spain), HIIA (Hungary), Notre Europe (France) and SIEPS (Sweden). 
Since 2005, an EPIN 'Steering Committee' takes the most important decisions. Currently there 
are seven member institutes: CEPS, ELCANO (Spain), Notre Europe (France), SIEPS 
(Sweden), HIIA (Hungary), Clingendael (Netherlands) and the European Institute of Romania 
(EIR). 
Structure 
Currently there are 34 EPIN members from 25 countries, also from countries outside of the 
EU. The 'hard core' work of the network is based on the cooperation of about 10 most active 
institutes. The member institutes are quite diverse in size and structure, but are all 
characterised by political independence and the absence of any predetermined point of view 
or political affiliation. 
EPIN organises at least three events across Europe per year. The network publishes Working 
Paper Series and other papers, which primarily focus on institutional reform of the Union. The 
network follows preparations for the European elections, the EU’s communication policy, and 
the political dynamics after enlargement, as well as EU foreign policy and justice and home 
affairs. 
Achievements 
EPIN is a network that offers its member institutes the opportunity to contribute to the 
'European added-value' for researchers, decision-makers and citizens. The network provides a 
unique platform for researchers and policy analysts to establish personal links, exchange 
knowledge and collaborate on EU-related issues. Members bring their national perspectives to 
bear on the issues tackled and through collaboration they contribute to establish a 'European 
added-value' (e.g. on EU communication, flexible integration). By doing so, they strengthen a 
common European dimension in the national debates on Europe. 
 
With the support of the European Union: Support for 
organisations active at European level in the field of active 
European citizenship. 
